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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
        v.
GERARD MOLLICA,
                      Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cr-00297-4)
District Judge:  The Honorable William J. Nealon
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 3, 2008
Before:  FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges, YOHN,  District Judge.*





Gerard Mollica appeals the District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence,
asserting that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.  He alleges that he is actually innocent and that his attorney’s erroneous
estimation of the length of his sentence caused him to plead guilty.  For the following
reasons, we will affirm.
I.
Mollica was arrested on September 18, 2006 and charged with conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and crack.  Mollica and plea counsel entered into plea negotiations with
the government, although Mollica now insists he was merely a drug user and not a
conspirator.  Plea counsel estimated that Mollica likely would be sentenced to
approximately sixty months, based on Mollica’s criminal record disclosed on a bail sheet,
the anticipated sentencing guidelines, and a downward departure motion by the
government in exchange for Mollica’s substantial assistance to the government.  When
making this estimate, plea counsel failed to anticipate that Mollica would be classified as
a career offender because plea counsel was relying on an apparently incomplete bail
history obtained from the government and reviewed with Mollica.  On November 17,
By signing the Statement of Defendant, Mollica and plea counsel certified that1
they understood the consequences of the plea agreement, including the maximum
sentence and waiver of trial rights.  The Statement of Defendant also included
representations that Mollica was admitting the facts of the indictment by pleading guilty,
was satisfied with his attorney’s representation, and had not received any promise, threat,
or inducement to enter into the plea agreement.
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2006, Mollica and plea counsel signed a written plea agreement and an accompanying
Statement of Defendant.1
A change-of-plea hearing began on the morning of December 13, 2006.  During a
recess precipitated by Mollica’s prison health care concerns, Mollica, plea counsel, and
government counsel discussed Mollica’s plea.  According to Mollica, during these
discussions government counsel and plea counsel together reaffirmed the sixty-month
sentence estimate.  The parties returned to the courtroom for the plea colloquy that
afternoon, and the court accepted Mollica’s guilty plea.
The presentence investigation report, dated February 26, 2007, concluded on the
basis of Mollica’s complete criminal history (which was longer than that included in his
bail history) that Mollica was a career offender under the sentencing guidelines.  The
report calculated a sentencing range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment and noted that a
downward departure might be warranted based on Mollica’s substantial assistance in the
government’s investigation.
As a result, on March 29, 2007, Mollica filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
After a hearing, the District Court denied that motion on May 4, 2007.  On May 16, 2007,
4the District Court sentenced Mollica to 168 months’ imprisonment to be followed by four
years’ supervised release, as well as a $100 special assessment.  The sentence included a
four-level downward departure based on Mollica’s substantial assistance to the
government.  On May 25, 2007, Mollica filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have
jurisdiction over the final judgment of conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.  The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying Mollica’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing.  We review a district court’s denial
of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Jones, 336
F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003).
III.
We look to three factors in evaluating whether a defendant may withdraw a guilty
plea:  (1) whether the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the strength of the defendant’s
reasons for withdrawing the plea; and (3) if the defendant has met his burden with respect
to one of the first two factors, whether the government would be prejudiced by the
withdrawal.  United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001); see also United
States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he government is not required
to show prejudice when a defendant has shown no sufficient grounds for permitting
withdrawal of the plea.’”).  “A shift in defense tactics, a change of mind, or the fear of
5punishment are not adequate reasons to impose on the government the expense, difficulty,
and risk of trying a defendant who has already acknowledged his guilt by pleading
guilty.”  Brown, 250 F.3d at 815 (citing United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir.
1992), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Roberson, 194
F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 1999)).  The defendant bears the burden of showing a fair and just
reason for withdrawing a guilty plea.  See Brown, 250 F.3d at 815; Gov’t of V.I. v. Berry,
631 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1980).
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mollica’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.  In ruling from the bench, the District Court noted the three
factors to be considered:
Now, as counsel has pointed out, the three areas that have to be
explored when there’s an attempt to withdraw a guilty plea is that the
Defendant asserts his innocence; and that there must be—the assertion must
be buttressed by facts in the record that support the claimed defense.
No. 2, it would be prejudicial to the Government if the withdrawal
was allowed.
And No. 3, the strength of the Defendant’s reasons for moving to
withdraw his plea.
(R. at 85.)  After evaluating the evidence in the record and the testimony relevant to
innocence and the reasons for seeking to withdraw the plea, the District Court concluded
that Mollica was not a credible witness and had not met his burden of showing why his
guilty plea should be withdrawn.  (R. at 85-86.)
6A.
Mollica’s evidence with respect to the first factor—the defendant’s assertion of his
innocence—is insufficient to permit withdrawal of his guilty plea.  “Bald assertions of
innocence are insufficient to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.”  Jones, 336
F.3d at 252.  “Assertions of innocence must be buttressed by facts in the record that
support a claimed defense,” and not simply by any inference that filing a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea creates.  Id. at 252-53 (quoting Brown, 250 F.3d at 818).  The
defendant must also explain the reason for his contradictory positions.  Id. at 253.
The District Court’s conclusion as to the first factor is supported by the record and
does not evidence an abuse of discretion.  The District Court concluded that Mollica’s
assertion that he was only a drug user and not a conspirator is not buttressed by the
record:  “I can say there’s very little in the record, except the Defendant’s bare testimony
that he’s innocent, to buttress this particular contention.  So I would conclude that the
assertion of innocence is inadequate and is not buttressed with sufficient portions of the
record that would sustain that particular belated claim.”  (R. at 85.)  The District Court
stated, moreover:
I can’t think of anything else that could have been added to the [plea
colloquy] that would have allowed the Defendant to proclaim innocence at
that time.  He was asked whether he understood the nature of the
proceedings, whether he was competent to proceed.
. . . 
And, furthermore, in response to the oral colloquy, he was
questioned on his innocence, and never once gave the slightest indication
7that he was being forced into pleading guilty or that he had any hesitation or
reluctance to enter a plea of guilty.
(R. at 85.)
On appeal, Mollica supports his assertion of innocence by pointing to statements
made during the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  He testified that days
after entering his guilty plea, he wrote to plea counsel asking to go to trial.  According to
his testimony, the letter stated:
I can’t sleep at night knowing that I’m going to do five years for this thing,
and you got drug dealers that are selling kilos of coke and getting the same
five years as me, and it’s wrong.  And I want to go to trial because I’m not
guilty of this crime.
(R. at 71.)  The letter referenced in this testimony does not appear to have been entered
into evidence in the District Court, and it is not in the record before this court.  Plea
counsel testified that Mollica “might have” requested to withdraw his guilty plea some
time in December 2003 and that “[a]t sometime after the plea” Mollica asserted to plea
counsel that he was not a conspirator but only a drug user.  (R. at 82.)  Mollica does not
buttress his claim of innocence with any evidence, but simply reiterates it.
Furthermore, during the plea colloquy Mollica repeatedly admitted his guilt.  After
the government counsel outlined the evidence that would be presented at trial, the court
asked, “Mr. Mollica, you have heard Government counsel outline the evidence that would
be presented against you.  Do you disagree with anything he had to say?”  Mollica
answered, “No.”  (R. at 141-42.)  The court confirmed, “Is everything he said true and
8correct?” and Mollica answered, “Yes.”  (R. at 142.)  When asked by the court “Are you
guilty as charged in Count 1?” Mollica replied, “Yes, I am.”  (R. at 142.)  The court
repeated this question, and Mollica again answered, “Yes, I am.”  (R. at 143.)  Moreover,
at the hearing on Mollica’s motion to withdraw his plea, Mollica told the court that he
would plead guilty again if a promise that he would be sentenced to sixty months were in
writing.  (R. at 75.)  These statements are inconsistent with his assertions of innocence.
To explain his contradictory statements about his innocence, Mollica asserts that
during the plea colloquy his mental state was poor.  When asked by the District Court
why he admitted to the factual basis for the conspiracy conviction during the plea
colloquy, Mollica responded:
Truthfully, sir, at that time—after that whole thing downstairs, my
mind was—I would just agree to anything.  I just wanted to get away from
everybody.  I wanted to go back to my cell. . . . I was confused.
(R. at 71.)  However, the District Court concluded that Mollica’s mental state did not
prevent him from understanding the plea colloquy.  During the morning session, when
Mollica’s health care needs were addressed, the District Court
was impressed by the recollection, the lucidity, the specificity of the
Defendant’s comments concerning his medical difficulties and the absence
of treatment as requested.  And it would certainly appear to [the court] that
at that time of the day in any event, he was very much in control of himself
and of his thoughts.
(R. at 85.)  Before the District Court recessed that morning, Mollica stated, without
prompting, “I’m going to plead guilty, Your Honor.”  (R. at 85.)  That statement indicated
9to the District Court “that this Defendant had in his mind entering a plea of guilty and
wanted the Court to know about it.”  (R. at 85.)  Furthermore, plea counsel explained that,
notwithstanding Mollica’s prior agitation, that afternoon “once we got into the courtroom,
Mr. Mollica appeared very relaxed, calm, cool; his tone had changed. . . .  Again, he was
very calm, collected and polite to both of us that day.”  (R. at 81.)  Thus, there is evidence
that Mollica’s mental state did not prevent him from understanding the nature of the
proceedings and the consequences of his asserting his guilt.  Mollica did not provide
evidence that adequately explained the reasons for his contradictory statements regarding
his innocence.
The District Court found Mollica not to be a credible witness, a finding this court
will not second-guess.  See United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1965)
(citing United States v. Nigro, 262 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1959)) (“The good faith,
credibility and weight of a defendant’s assertions and those made on his behalf in support
of a motion [to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing] are preeminently issues for the
hearing court to decide.”).  Given Mollica’s inconsistent testimony and the absence of
evidence in the record—other than his own statements—supporting his claims of
innocence, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding Mollica’s claims
regarding his innocence unpersuasive.
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B.
With respect to the second factor—the strength of the defendant’s reasons for
withdrawing the plea—the District Court correctly concluded that Mollica’s mistaken
belief regarding his likely sentence was not a sufficiently strong reason to permit
withdrawal of the plea, given the thorough plea colloquy in which he had engaged.  In
particular, the District Court reasoned that
he was told that he could get as high as 40 years[’] imprisonment, that any
estimate given to him by counsel was not binding upon the Court at all, that
he admitted to the accuracy and reliability of the statement of the
Government, as well as the allegations in the plea agreement, all of which
were very extensive and very inclusive.
(R. at 85.)  The District Court’s conclusion with respect to the strength of Mollica’s
reasons for moving to withdraw his guilty plea is supported by the record and does not
evidence an abuse of discretion.
First, the plea agreement signed by Mollica and counsel for the government
includes admonitions regarding potential sentence length and the discretion of the
government and the court with respect to the sentence length.  Regarding the
government’s sentencing recommendation, the agreement provides:
At the time of sentencing, the United States may make a recommendation
that it considers appropriate based upon the nature and circumstances of the
case and the defendant’s participation in the offense, and specifically
reserves the right to recommend a sentence up to and including the
maximum sentence of imprisonment and fine allowable, together with the
cost of prosecution.
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(R. at 154.)  With respect to the maximum sentence Mollica faced, the agreement
provides:
The defendant understands that the Court is not a party to and is not bound
by this agreement nor any recommendation made by the parties.  Thus, the
Court is free to impose upon the defendant any sentence up to and including
the maximum sentence of imprisonment of forty years, a fine of $2 million,
a maximum term of supervised release of up to life, which shall be served at
the conclusion of and in addition to any term of imprisonment, the costs of
prosecution, denial of certain federal benefits and assessments totaling
$100.
(R. at 159.)  Mollica told the District Court that he read and understood the plea
agreement, that he discussed it with counsel, and that everything in the agreement was
acceptable to him.  (R. at 134.)  He testified that he understood any sentence
recommendation made by the government would not be binding on the District Court and
that the District Court’s sentence might differ from any estimate given to him by plea
counsel.  (R. at 136, 137.)  He also testified that he understood that “if the sentence is
more severe that [he] expected, [he would] still be bound by [the] guilty plea and [would]
have no right to withdraw it.”  (R. at 138.)  He testified similarly with respect to the
Statement of the Defendant, which also explained the maximum sentence and the court’s
discretion in imposing a sentence.  (R. at 132-33, 145-47.)
Second, the plea agreement makes clear that no promises other than those
contained in the writing are part of the plea agreement.  (See R. at 163-64.)  Mollica
testified that no one had “made any promise, representation, agreement or understanding
with [him], other than what’s contained in the written plea agreement.”  (R. at 135.)  He
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further testified that he understood that he could “not at a later time contend that any
promise, representation, agreement or understanding was made to [him] by any person,
either in or outside of Court, other than what’s contained in the written plea agreement.” 
(R. at 135-36.)  Mollica did not mention his impression that he would be sentenced to
sixty months.
Third, Mollica’s guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.  Mollica
argues that his plea was not knowing as a result of his not having been fairly apprised of
the consequences of his plea as it related to sentencing.  When challenging a guilty plea,
“a defendant has the burden of persuasion to establish that a plea was neither intelligent
nor voluntary.”  United States v. Stewart, 977 F.2d 81, 85 (3d Cir. 1992).  For a plea to be
valid, the defendant must have been advised of, and must have understood, the “direct
consequences” of his plea.  Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1995),
superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87 (3d
Cir. 1996).  The Third Circuit has held that “[t]he only consequences considered direct
are the maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged.”  Id. (quoting United
States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1130 (3d Cir. 1991)).  Mollica was repeatedly advised
of the maximum sentence and fine that could be imposed consistent with the plea
agreement, and Mollica told the trial court that he understood the consequences of his
plea.
Mollica was adamant that one robbery listed on the bail sheet had been reversed2
on appeal.  Plea counsel located a New York decision reversing the conviction and
ordering a new trial.  Mollica assured plea counsel that he was never retried.  However,
unbeknownst to plea counsel, Mollica had later pled guilty to that offense.  (R. at 79.)
Another robbery was reported on the bail sheet with no disposition.  When plea
counsel received the presentence report, he discovered that Mollica had also been
convicted of and sentenced for that robbery on the same day as another robbery.  (Id.)
Mollica testified that “they pulled out a rap sheet of my record that they had, and I3
had a .11 score on it—11 score.  And they went on the guidelines and said, It’s 110
months, and I will put in a full assistance departure, and I will have to go under the 60
months because then [plea counsel] could put in his 2-level departure for your medical
‘cause if you don’t go under the 60 months, then I can’t put the medical departure in
. . . .”  (R. at 67.)  Later in his testimony before the District Court, Mollica explained that
he said to plea counsel and government counsel, “My record is a little more than [what is
reflected on the bail history], you know what I mean.  It’s going to be a little more.” 
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Mollica also argues that his plea was not voluntary because plea counsel’s error
regarding the likely sentence length and the prosecutor’s concurrence with that estimate
induced him to plead guilty.  As noted above, Mollica repeatedly was advised of—and
repeatedly stated that he understood—the maximum sentence to which he was exposed. 
Moreover, Mollica himself had the relevant information indicating that the sixty-month
estimate based on his criminal history as set forth on the bail sheet was likely too low. 
Plea counsel explained to the District Court that, based on Mollica’s bail sheet, he was
initially concerned that Mollica might be classified as a career offender.  But Mollica
assured plea counsel that he would not be classified as a career offender.   Additionally,2
when Mollica met with plea counsel and the prosecutor on the afternoon of his plea,
Mollica testified that he knew that the bail history the lawyers were reviewing was a
preliminary—and incomplete—record.   Mollica also knew that the plea was not binding3
(R. at 73.)  Mollica testified that plea counsel replied, “Well, no, this is what they’re
going on.”  (Id.)
Plea counsel advised Mollica that he could request a guilty plea agreement with4
the government that would include a binding agreement as to sentence, but that Mollica
would not then be able to request a further reduction based on his medical condition. 
Mollica decided he did not want such a plea agreement.  (R. at 79.)
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as to the sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).  Referring to the
sentence to be imposed by the court, plea counsel “advised him that what he had in front
of him was not a binding plea; it was not binding on the [c]ourt.  He understood that and
accepted it.”   (R. at 79.)4
Furthermore, Mollica’s plea appears to comport with all constitutional
requirements.  See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 & 244 n.7 (1969).  “A
transcript showing full compliance with the customary inquiries and admonitions
furnishes strong, although not necessarily conclusive, evidence that the accused entered
his plea without coercion and with an appreciation of its consequences.”  Stewart, 977
F.2d at 84.
Fourth, the District Court found Mollica’s testimony not credible.  The District
Court reported:  “I would say that the [d]efendant’s testimony was somewhat inconsistent,
emotional, erratic and difficult to follow, and I will reject it as to the allegations that he
has made against the other witnesses in this particular case.  So I accept the testimony of
the Government witnesses.”  (R. at 86.)  A probation officer and a U.S. Marshal testified
for the government that, while they were in the holding cell before the plea colloquy with
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Mollica, plea counsel, and counsel for the government, they observed neither plea counsel
nor counsel for the government “badger or threaten Mr. Mollica in any way” or “shout or
yell at Mr. Mollica about anything regarding this case.”  (R. at 76, 77.)  Plea counsel
testified for the government that he never promised Mollica that Mollica would serve any
particular sentence and that he believed Mollica understood the sixty-month estimate to
be just that—an estimate.  (R. at 79-80.)  Furthermore, plea counsel testified that he
discussed the plea agreement with Mollica and that he understood Mollica to be clear that
the District Court could sentence him to up to forty years’ imprisonment.  (R. at 80.)
In sum, Mollica has not sustained his burden of showing that his guilty plea was
not knowing and voluntary because of plea counsel’s miscalculation of the estimated
sentence.  See Jones, 336 F.3d at 254 (concluding that the defendant’s assertion that his
plea counsel’s promise of a sentence of “no less than 57 months and no more than 71
months” did not cause a plea resulting in a longer sentence to be unknowing and
involuntary where the court held a thorough plea colloquy and “the record fails to clearly
demonstrate either that the misrepresentations occurred or that [the defendant] was
prejudiced”).  The District Court engaged in a thorough plea colloquy with Mollica.  It
found Mollica’s testimony regarding his mental state at the plea colloquy not credible.  It
then found that Mollica’s assertion of innocence was not supported by any facts and that
his proffered reasons for withdrawing his plea were not sufficiently strong to support
Because Mollica did not show sufficient grounds for withdrawal of his plea based5
on either his innocence or the strength of his reasons for withdrawing the plea, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion by not addressing the third factor, relating to
prejudice to the government.  See Martinez, 785 F.2d at 116.
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withdrawal of the plea.  In making these findings, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion.5
IV.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mollica’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.  Mollica has shown no sufficient grounds for permitting
withdrawal of the plea.  We will, therefore, affirm the judgment of the District Court.
